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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RANCH HOMES, INC. ,

PlaintiffRespondent,
vs.

Case No. 15467

GREATER PARK CITY
CORPORATION,

DefendantAppellant.

REPLY BRIEF

Appellant Greater Park City Company (hereinafter
"GPCC") files this reply brief because of two rather surprising arguments made by appellee Ranch Homes in its brief.
First, contrary to an admission at trial, Ranch Homes' brief
asserts that only the general character of its reliance
damages need have been foreseeable.

All of the authorities,

however, agree that out-of-pocket expenditures are items of
special damage.

Special damages are not recoverable unless

GPCC had notice of the special facts creating the unusual
risk at the time of contracting.
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Second, Ranch Homes argues in its brief that the
doctrine of mitigation of damages does not require it to
make another contract with GPCC, even though that contract
would result in avoiding any loss.

GPCC submits that the

better-reasoned authority is contrary.

If Ranch Homes could

reasonably have mitigated its damages by entering into a new
contract with GPCC, the law requires it to do so.
I

OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURES ARE
ITEMS OF SPECIAL DAMAGE. AT THE TIME OF
CONTRACTING, GPCC DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF
ANY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES CREATING UNUSUAL RISKS
General damages are those which would naturally be
expected to result from the type of breach, while special
damages result from the circumstances particular to the case
at hand.

Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah Sup. Ct.

1975); see generally, Restatement of Contracts§ 330; 22
Am. Jur.

2d "Damages" § 15.
General damages in Utah for breach of a land sales

contract are the market value of the property at the time of '
sale less the contract price.
83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962).
benefit of his bargain.
520 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1978).

Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d

This gives to the vendee the
Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d
The measure of general damages

for breach of an option agreement is the same.
Lovitz, 255 F. Supp. 302

See Cohen_1.:.

(D.D.C. 1966); Capaldi v.
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~alty

Core., 350 Mass. 765, 214 N.E.2d 71 (Mass. Sup. Jud.

Ct. 1966).
Out-of-pocket expenditures are clearly items of
special damage.

All of the authorities agree.

Mendoyoma,

Inc. v. County of Mendocino, 8 Cal. App. 3d 873, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 740 (1970); Platts v. Arney, 50 Wash. 2d 42, 309 P.2d
372 (1957)

("Preparatory expenses, and expenses in part per-

formance, are . . • special damages"); McCormick on Damages
§

8 (1935); 17 A.L.R.2d 1300, 1308-09, Anno.:

"Right to recover,

in action for breach of contract, expenditures incurred in
preparation for performance"; cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418, 19 A.L.R.3d 1043 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
Counsel for Ranch Homes also agreed at trial that its expenditures were items of special damage.

(R. 314)

.'!:../

GPCC argued in its opening brief that the general
measure of damages for breach of an option agreement should
be the exclusive measure of damages, and that no damages
should be awarded for expenditures made.

If the Court holds

that special damages may be considered for breach of an
option agreement, then the "foreseeability" test for special

!Y

Counsel for GPCC apologizes for the sa:newhat confusing nature of the
citations to the First and Second Transcripts in its openirq brief.
GPCC's initial brief would have cited this reference as (1st Tr., 2 at
1) . The First Transcript (1st Tr.) starts at R. 193. The first page
of the first volume (1 at 2) begins at R. 201, volume 2 (2 at 1)
carmences at R. 314, and the third volume (3 at 1) starts at R. 464.
The Second Transcript (2d Tr.) starts at R. 565. The first page of
the proceedings (2d Tr. at 2) carrnences at R. 569.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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damages must be closely examined.

GPCC respectfully submits

that the Lower Court erred in finding that Ranch Homes'
expenditures were foreseeable by the parties (Finding No.

13,

R. 166).

Special damages are not recoverable unless GPCC had
notice of the special facts creating the unusual risk at the
time of contracting.

Prince v. Peterson, supra, at 1328

(special damage should be specially "proved by evidence
showing such circumstances in the individual case.");
2d "Damages" § 59;

5 Corbin on Contracts

on Damages §§ 140-141 (1935).

§

22 Arn. j

1014 (1964); McCor4

Only two arguments made by

Ranch Homes could be construed as putting GPCC on notice of
special risks.

First, Ranch Homes asserts in its brief that

GPCC had notice of the special circumstances because of a
single conversation which occurred on an airplane between
principals of the two parties.

Second, Ranch Homes asserts

that the option agreement itself gave GPCC notice.

GPCC

submits that both of these arguments are insufficient, and
that reasonable minds cannot differ -- it never had sufficient'
notice of the special circumstances creating the unusual risk
at the time of contracting.
In the spring of 197 4, Jim Fahs of Ranch Homes and
Bob Wells of GPCC were seatmates on an airplane trip to
California.

(R. 233).

Fahs told Wells only that he had a

group of investors who wanted to "develop a single-family
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residential community," and that they foresaw a real need for
an FHA-approved type of subdivision.
specific than this was ever said.

(Id.).

Nothing more

Fahs never mentioned that

Ranch Hornes would definitely seek FHA financing, only that
there appeared to be a market in Park City for such a housing
project.

Fahs never stated that financing would be sought

before exercise of the option, or that all of the design work
and planning would be completed for all of the phases of the
project, including the housing units, prior to the exercise
of the option.

Also, Fahs never related that Ranch Homes was

going to design its housing development in an extraordinary
manner with "cluster" housing at the end of cul-de-sac streets,
and with unusual planting islands in the middle of each
cul-de-sac.

Can it be said that GPCC had notice of these and

all of the other special and extraordinary circumstances at
the time of signing the Option Agreement when Ranch Homes' intent
"from the outset", according to Fahs, was that a purchaser could
have bought a lot and built his own house upon the property
without using their plans?

(R. 956-960).

The option agreement itself does not provide any
notice to GPCC of the special items of damage which may be
suffered by Ranch Homes.

It contains typical option provisions,

and, upon exercise, i t was to serve as a land sales contract.
Most of the provisions cited in respondent's brief related
to conveyances of the property after exercise of the option.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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....

(See pp. 3-5, 11 and 12 of Ranch Hornes' brief).

Th e only

restriction upon the use of the property contained in the
option agreement is that Ranch Hornes, upon exercise of the
option, utilized it for the development of a single-fa~~
residential homesite for a period of 20 years, unless specific
approval is obtained from GPCC to utilize it for some other
purpose.

,I

10.

(See Plaintiff's Ex. 2, the Option Agreement, at

All exhibits are found at R. 192).

The option agree-

ment does not give notice to GPCC of the type of financing,
if any, Ranch Homes proposes for the property; the type of
design it contemplates for the housing development; the type
of expenditures it will incur prior to exercise of the
option; or any clue to the other unusual types of expenditures
as outlined on pages 5 through 7 of Appellant's opening brief.

Whether Ranch Homes chose to exercise the option one week afte:'

i t was executed without making any expenditures or seven montl'i
later after making extraordinary preparations was completely
within its discretion.

Only Ranch Homes could control what

expenditures were to be made, and the option agreement never
gave GPCC any notice of special circumstances.
The authorities support the position that mere

knowledge of Ranch Homes' intent to develop a single-family :
housing project cannot impose upon GPCC the legal responsibilL
to foresee the unusual types of expenditures incurred prior t:
the exercise of the option.

In the leading case of
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~

.

co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903), Mr. Justice
Holmes had occasion to consider an action for breach of a sales
contract.

In addition to claiming damages for the difference

between the contract price of the commodity (oil) and the market
value at the time of breach, plaintiff sued for special damages.

ic

The contract was silent as to how plaintiff intended to transport
the oil.

Plaintiff, however, alleged that both parties understood

it would rent tank cars to be filled at defendant's location.
Because of defendant's breach, plaintiff claimed it had been
specially damaged because of the commitment it made to send
the tank cars 1,000 miles to defendant's location.
In affirming the granting of defendant's motion to
dismiss, the Court stated:

')

"It may be said with safety that mere notice
to a seller of some interest or probable action
of the buyer is not enough necessarily and as
matter of law to charge the seller with special
damage . .
[I]t is obvious that the plaintiff
was free to bring its tanks from where it liked,-a thousand miles away or an adjoining yard,--so
far as the contract was concerned. The allegation
hardly amounts to saying that the defendant had
notice that the plaintiff was likely to send its
cars from a distance. ***The knowledge must be
brought home to the party sought to be charged,
under such circumstances that he must know that
the person he contracts with reasonably bel'ieves
that he accepts the contract with the special
condition attached to it."
Id. at 545.
Similarly, in Mendoyoma, supra, the appellant sought to recover,
~nte£ alia,

for $14,237.33 interest paid on loans which it had

<I

I

l
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obtained to fund the initial development of its bu ·
s1ness

v~nt

In excluding this item of special damage, the California

c

our:

of Appeals stated:
"In the present case the record is devoid of
any evidence that performance of the contract
was to be financed through loans. * * *
Certainly i t cannot be said that appellant's
resorting to borrowing, and the subsequent
obligation to pay interest, was foreseeable
by either party at the time of contracting
II

87 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
In the instant case, GPCC had no notice at the time
of contracting of the special circumstances creating the unus,
risks.

If this Court sustains the findings of the Trial cour:

i t will be equivalent to a pronouncement that all types of
expenditures are foreseeable during an option period.

It is

improbable that GPCC undertook to guarantee performance with
such extreme special damages in mind.

The option price of

$10, 000 was a mere 2% of the sales price of $510, 000.

There

simply no evidence to show that GPCC had notice of any specia.
circumstances at the time of contracting.
One final point raised in Ranch Homes' brief needs
response.

To be recoverable as special damages, out-of-pockr

expenditures must not only be specifically foreseeable, but
they must also be "reasonably" incurred.
Contracts § 333.

Restatement of

Assuming arguendo that GPCC did have notice

of the special circumstances, the testimony of Mr. Trayner an
Professor Hashimoto vividly demonstrates that the expendituri
made by Ranch Homes were not reasonably incurred.

The testi·

many of these two expert witnesses was the only testimony
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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outlining the industry standards which should be followed
by a reasonably prudent developer after obtaining an option
but before exercising it.

Their testimony was not impeached,

nor was it controverted by the testimony of Ranch Hornes'
principals or its witnesses.

In fact, Max Engeman, executive

vice president of First Security State Bank, one of plaintiff's
witnesses who was called to explain the customary practices
of bankers with respect to the making of real estate loans,
confirmed Mr. Trayner's testimony.

(R. 901).

Although a trier of fact is vested with broad
discretion, it is not without limit.

It is a fundamental rule

of evidence that the uncontroverted testimony of a credible
witness may not be arbitrarily disregarded by the trier of fact.
Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622
(1956); Wirz v. Wirz, 96 Cal. App. 2d 171, 214 P.2d 839, 15
A.L.R.2d 1129 (1950).

Where the testimony of a witness,

whether expert or lay, is uncontradicted and not inherently
improbable, and there are no circumstances, such as impeachment, to raise a doubt as to its truth, the facts so proven
must be taken as conclusively established and a decision
entered accordingly.

American Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 120 Utah

402, 235 P.2d 361 (1951); Stafos v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co.,
367 F.2d 314 (10th Cir. 1966).
Based upon the foregoing, GPCC submits that the
clear weight and credibility of the evidence points to only

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

one conclusion -- that it did not have notice of the sp

.
ec1a1
facts creating the unusual risks at the time of contract~
g,

and that the expenditures made by Ranch Hornes were not
reasonable.

II
RANCH HOMES COULD HAVE MITIGATED ITS DAMAGES
BY ENTERING INTO A NEW CONTRACT WITH GPCC
Ranch Hornes argues in its brief that the doctriM
of mitigation of damages does not require it to make another
contract with GPCC, even though that contract would result ir.
avoiding any loss.

This argument is contrary to the policy

behind the doctrine of mitigation and the better-reasoned
authority.
The policy behind the rule of mitigation is that a
plaintiff must use a "reasonable effort" to avoid his own dac
See generally, Restatement of Contracts
"Damages" § 33.

~

336

&

22 Am. Jur. 1;

Therefore, as a general rule an employee who

has been wrongfully discharged is bound to accept his employe:
offer of reemployment in the same or a similar position in or:
to reduce the damages, where such reemployment may be accepte:
without prejudice to the employee's rights under the original
contract.

72 A.L.R. 1049, 1054, Anno:

"Employer's offer to

take back employee wrongfully discharged as affecting former'
liability."

In the case of failure by a contractor to delive:

goods or render services, it is usually required that the
·
·
plaintiff
throug h reasona bl e effort secure other similar goo:
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or obtain another workman.

Restatement of Contracts § 336,

comment b on Subsection (1).

If a reasonably prudent person

acting under the circumstances in which the plaintiff found
himself would have minimized the claimed losses by entering
into another contract with a third party, this may also be
shown in mitigation of damages.
§

22 Am. Jur. 2d "Damages"

34.
In the instant case, GPCC was unable to perform

on the option agreement because of its financial inability
to bring a road and utilities to the subject property,
which was located at the northerly edge of an area known
as the Holiday Ranch.

v

GPCC made several offers of other

more accessible property to Ranch Homes.

These offers would

not have required the expenditure of additional sums of money
by Ranch Homes.

GPCC proposed to sell these other tracts of

land at substantially less than the $17,000 per acre Ranch
Homes agreed to pay for the optioned property.
There is a split of authority as to whether a plaintiff
may be required to enter into a new contract with the defaulting
party.

22 Am. Jur. 2d "Damages" § 35; 46 A.L.R. 1192, Anno:

"Duty to minimize damages by accepting offer modified by party
who has breached contract of sale."

Y

As Professor Corbin stated:

The facts dealing with mitigation of damages are set out in detail
on pp. 22-25 of GPCC's opening brief. Only a concise sunmary is
given here.
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"Courts have held that it is not necessary
for the plaintiff to make another contract
with the defendant who has repudiated, even
though he offers terms that would result
in avoiding loss.
Other courts have held
otherwise, however, if no personal humiliation
or great inconvenience is involved in making
the new contract."
5 Corbin on Contracts § 1043 (1964).
GPCC submits that the better-reasoned authority wou1:
deny recovery to Ranch Homes for failing to enter into a ne'•
contract with GPCC because it could have reasonably mitigate.
its damages by doing so.

Any other rule would be contrary t:

the policy of the doctrine in requiring a plaintiff to ~t
reasonably in reducing his damages.

There is no valid disti:

between the instant circumstances and those requiring an emp;
to accept an offer of reemployment, those which require a mer
to cover by purchasing other goods or services, and those ck
stances which generally require a plaintiff to enter into anc
contract with a third party.

As the Ten th Circuit recently i

"A damaged party entitled to the benefl.t of
a contract is under a duty to mitigate his
damages, and generally speaking his rights
are not diminished if the circumstances force
him to deal with the party in default."
Stanspec Corp. v. Jelco, Inc., 464 F.2d
1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 1972).
GPCC submits, and reasonable minds cannot differ, tho
under the circumstances Ranch Homes could have reasonably
mitigated its damages by entering into one of several possibl
contracts with GPCC.

Therefore, its failure to do so bars i:

right to recovery, and the judgment below should be reversed.
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III

CONCLUSION
GPCC respectfully submits that it did not have
notice of any special circumstances creating unusual risks
at the time of contracting, and that Ranch Homes' out-ofpocket expenditures were not reasonable.

Therefore, the

judgment below should be reversed and a new judgment
entered for GPCC.
GPCC also submits that the doctrine of mitigation of
damages required Ranch Homes to enter into a new contract with
GPCC.

Ranch Homes' refusal to do so was not reasonable under

the circumstances of the case.

Therefore, the judgment below

should be reversed and a new judgment entered in GPCC's favor.
Respectfully submitted this

:2.'i5

day of September, 1978.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
F. s. Prince, Jr.
Donald J. Winder
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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